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Abstract
We consider an infinite horizon dynamic mechanism design problem with interdepen-
dent valuations. In this setting the type of each agent is assumed to be evolving ac-
cording to a first order Markov process and is independent of the types of other agents.
However, the valuation of an agent can depend on the types of other agents, which
makes the problem fall into an interdependent valuation setting. Designing truth-
ful mechanisms in this setting is non-trivial in view of an impossibility result which
says that for interdependent valuations, any efficient and ex-post incentive compatible
mechanism must be a constant mechanism, even in a static setting. Mezzetti (2004)
circumvents this problem by splitting the decisions of allocation and payment into two
stages. However, Mezzetti’s result is limited to a static setting and moreover in the
second stage of that mechanism, agents are weakly indifferent about reporting their
valuations truthfully. This paper provides a first attempt at designing a dynamic mech-
anism which is efficient, strict ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individually
rational in a setting with interdependent values and Markovian type evolution.
1 Introduction
Organizations often face the problem of executing a task for which they do not have enough
resources or expertise. It may also be difficult, both logistically and economically, to acquire
those resources. For example, in the area of healthcare, it has been observed that there are
very few occupational health professionals and doctors and nurses in all specialities at the
hospitals in the UK (Nicholson, 2004). With the advances in computing and communication
∗A preliminary version of this work was presented in the conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelli-
gence, 2011.
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technologies, a natural solution to this problem is to outsource the tasks to experts outside
the organization. Hiring experts beyond an organization was already in practice. However,
with the advent of the Internet, this practice has extended even beyond the international
boundaries, e.g., some U.S. hospitals are outsourcing the tasks of reading and analyzing scan
reports to companies in Bangalore, India (Associated-Press, 2004). Gupta et al. (2008) give
a detailed description of how the healthcare industry uses the outsourcing tool.
The organizations where the tasks are outsourced (let us call them vendors) have quite
varied efficiency levels. For tasks like healthcare, it is extremely important to hire the right
set of experts. If the efficiency levels of the vendors and the difficulties of the medical tasks
are observable by a central management (controller), and if the efficiency levels vary over time
according to a Markov process, the problem of selecting the right set of experts reduces to a
Markov Decision Problem (MDP), which has been well studied in the literature (Bertsekas,
1995; Puterman, 2005). Let us call the efficiency levels and task difficulties together as types
of the tasks and resources.
However, the types are usually observed privately by the vendors and hospitals (agents),
who are rational and intelligent. The efficiencies of the vendors are private information of the
vendors (depending on what sort of doctors they hire, or machines they use), and they might
misreport this information in order to win the contract and to increase their net returns. At
the same time the difficulty of the medical task is private to the hospital, and is unknown
to the experts. A strategic hospital, therefore, can misreport the task difficulty to the hired
experts as well. Hence, the asymmetry of information at different agents’ end transforms
the problem from a completely or partially observable MDP into a dynamic game among the
agents.
Motivated by examples of this kind, in this paper, we analyze them using a formal
mechanism design framework. We consider only cases where the solution of the problem
involves monetary compensation in quasi-linear form. The reporting strategy of the agents
and the decision problem of the controller is dynamic since we assume that the types of
the tasks and resources are varying with time. In addition, the above problem has two
characteristics, namely, interdependent values : in a selected team of agents, the valuation of
an agent depends not only on her own skills but also on the skills of other selected agents,
and exchange economy : a trade environment where both buyers (task owners) and sellers
(resources) are present. In this paper, the theme of modeling and analysis would be centered
around the settings of task outsourcing to strategic experts. We aim to have a socially
efficient mechanism, and at the same time, that would demand truthfulness and voluntary
participation of the agents.
1.1 Prior work
The above properties have been investigated separately in literature on dynamic mechanism
design. Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010) have proposed an efficient mechanism called the
dynamic pivot mechanism, which is a generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973) in a dynamic setting, and serves to be
truthful and efficient. Athey and Segal (2007) consider a similar setting with an aim to find
an efficient mechanism that is budget balanced. Cavallo et al. (2006) develop a mechanism
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similar to the dynamic pivot mechanism in a setting with agents whose type evolution follows
a Markov process. In a later work, Cavallo et al. (2009) consider periodically inaccessible
agents and dynamic private information jointly. Even though these mechanisms work for an
exchange economy, they have the underlying assumption of private values, i.e., the reward
experienced by an agent is a function of the allocation and her own private types. Mezzetti
(2004, 2007), on the other hand, explored the other facet, namely, interdependent values, but
in a static setting, and proposed a truthful mechanism. The mechanism proposed in these two
papers use a two-stage mechanism, since it is impossible to design a single-stage mechanism
satisfying both truthfulness and efficiency even for a static setting (Jehiel and Moldovanu,
2001). However, the mechanism provides a weak truthfulness guarantee in the second stage
of the game. A similar result in the setting of interdependent valuations with static types
by Nath and Zoeter (2013) ensures that the truthfulness guarantee is strict. However, since
both Nath and Zoeter (2013) and Mezzetti (2004) consider mechanisms that use two stages
of information realization - in the first stage the types are realized and the allocation is
decided, and in the second stage the valuations are realized by the agents and payments are
decided - both of them require attention on how the information is revealed to the agents.
In this paper, we follow an approach similar to Nath and Zoeter (2013) that guarantees
strict truthfulness. However, the equilibrium concept used here is ex-post Nash because
we assume agents play in an incomplete information setting, and contrast this with the
mechanism of Mezzetti (2004). We also discuss how a complete information setting along
with the equilibrium concept of subgame perfection plays an important role in these results.
We explain this point in detail while presenting the main result of the paper.
1.2 Contributions
In this paper, we propose a dynamic mechanism named MDP-based Allocation and
TRansfer in Interdependent-valued eXchange economies (abbreviated MATRIX), which is
designed to address the class of interdependent values. It extends the results of Mezzetti
(2004) to a dynamic setting, and with a certain allocation and valuation structure, serves as
an efficient, truthful mechanism where agents receive non-negative payoffs by participating
in it. The key feature that distinguishes our model and results from that of the existing
dynamic mechanism literature is that we address the interdependent values and dynami-
cally varying types (in an exchange economy) jointly and provide a strict ex-post incentive
compatible mechanism. In Table 1, we have summarized the different paradigms of the
mechanism design problem, and their corresponding solutions in the literature.
Valuations STATIC DYNAMIC
Independent VCG Mechanism Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
(Vickrey, 1961; Clarke,
1971; Groves, 1973)
(Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2010;
Cavallo et al., 2006)
Interdependent Generalized VCG Mechanism MATRIX
(Mezzetti, 2004) (this paper)
Table 1: The different paradigms of mechanism design problems with their solutions.
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Our main contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows.
• We propose a dynamic mechanism MATRIX, that is efficient, truthful (Theorem 1) and
voluntary participatory (Theorem 2) for the agents in an interdependent-valued ex-
change economy.
◮ This extends the classic mechanism proposed by Mezzetti (2004) to a dynamic set-
ting.
◮ It solves the issue of weak indifference by the agents in the second stage of the classic
mechanism.
However, we will see that Theorem 1 is true with a restricted domain of subset allocation
and peer-influenced valuations. These two properties were not needed to achieve a
similar claim in the static setting (Nath and Zoeter, 2013). We do not know if these
are the minimal requirements for efficiency and truthfulness, but it is important to
note that these properties in the dynamic setting do not immediately follow from its
static counterpart.
• We discuss why the dynamic pivot mechanism (Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2010) does
not satisfy all the properties that MATRIX satisfies (Section 3.2).
• We discuss that these results can be extended to a more general setting in Section 4.
We also discuss that MATRIX comes at a computational cost which is the same as that of
its independent value counterpart (Section 3.4).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the formal model in Section 2,
and present the main results in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss about a generalization of
the main results. We conclude the paper in Section 5 with some potential future works.
2 Background and Model
Let the set of agents be given by N = {1, . . . , n}, who interact with each other for a countably
infinite time horizon indexed by time steps t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. The time-dependent type of each
agent is denoted by θi,t ∈ Θi for i ∈ N . We will use the shorthands θt ≡ (θ1,t, . . . , θn,t) ≡
(θi,t, θ−i,t), where θ−i,t denotes the type vector of all agents excluding agent i. We will refer
to θt as the type profile at time t, θt ∈ Θ ≡ ×i∈NΘi.
The allocation set is denoted by A. In each round t, the mechanism designer chooses
an allocation at from this set and decides a payment pi,t to agent i. The allocation leads
to a valuation to agent i, vi : A × Θ → R. This is in contrast to the classical independent
valuations (also called private values) case where valuations are assumed to depend only on
i’s own type; vi : A× Θi → R. However, we assume for all i, |vi(a, θ)| ≤ M < ∞, for some
M ∈ R and for all a and θ.
Stationary Markov Type Transitions, SMTT The combined type θt follows a first
order Markov process which is governed by the transition probability function F (θt+1|at, θt),
which is independent across agents, where at is the allocation at period t.
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Definition 1 (Stationary Markov Type Transitions, SMTT) We call the type tran-
sitions to follow stationary Markov type transitions if the joint distribution F of the types of
the agents θt ≡ (θ1,t, · · · , θn,t), and the marginals Fi’s exhibit the following for all t.
F (θt+1|at, θt, θt−1, · · · , θ0) = F (θt+1|at, θt), and
F (θt+1|at, θt) =
∏
i∈N
Fi(θi,t+1|at, θi,t).
(1)
We will assume the types to follow SMTT throughout this paper.
For an easier exposition of the more general properties that lead to the same conclusions
as in this paper, we will restrict our attention to a restricted space of allocations and valua-
tions. In Section 4, we comment on the generalization of our results by introducing certain
assumptions that subsume the following two assumptions on the allocation and valuations.
Subset Allocation, SA Let us motivate this restriction with the medical task assign-
ment example given in the previous section. The organizations outsource tasks to experts
for a payment, where the expert may have different and often time-varying capabilities of
executing the task. The task owners come with a specific task difficulty (type of the task
owner), which is usually privately known to them, while the workers’ capabilities (types of
the workers) are their private information. A central planner’s job in this setting is to ef-
ficiently assign the tasks to a group of workers. Clearly, in this setting, the set of possible
allocations is the set of the subsets of agents, i.e., A = 2N . Note that, for a finite set of
players, the allocation set is always finite. So, we can formally define this setting as follows.
Definition 2 (Subset Allocation, SA) When the set of allocations is the set of all sub-
sets of the agent set, i.e., A = 2N , we call the domain a subset allocation domain. Similarly,
A−i = 2
N\{i} denotes the set of allocations excluding agent i.
Peer Influenced Valuations, PIV Even though the valuation of agent i is affected
by not only her private type but also by the types of others, it is often the case that the
valuation is affected by the types (e.g. the efficiencies of the workers in a joint project) of
only the selected agents. The valuation therefore is a function of the types of the allocated
agents and not the whole type vector. We also assume that the value of a non-selected agent
is zero. The set of valuations satisfying the above two conditions is called the set of peer
influenced valuations (PIV).
Definition 3 (Peer Influenced Valuations, PIV) This is a special set of interdepen-
dent valuations in the SA domain, where the valuation of agent i is a function of the types
of other selected agents, given by,
vi(a, θ) =
{
vi(a, θa) if i ∈ a
0 otherwise,
(2)
where θa ∈ ×i∈aΘi, for an allocation a ∈ A = 2
N .
The properties SA and PIV together allow for a well-defined counterfactual social welfare
in a world where a particular agent does not exist. See also Equation (8).
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Efficient Allocation, EFF The mechanism designer aims to maximize the sum of
the valuations of task owners and workers, summed over an infinite horizon, geometrically
discounted with factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The discount factor accounts for the fact that a future
payoff is less valued by an agent than a current stage payoff. We assume δ to be common
knowledge. If the designer would have perfect information about the θt’s, his objective would
be to find a policy πt, which is a sequence of allocation functions from time t, that yields the
following for all t and for all type profiles θt,
πt ∈ argmax
γ
Eγ,θt
[
∞∑
s=t
δs−t
∑
i∈N
vi(as(θs), θs)
]
, (3)
where γ = (at(·), at+1(·), . . .) is any arbitrary sequence of allocation functions. Here we use
Eγ,θt [·] = E[ · |θt; γ] for brevity of notation. We point to the fact that the allocation policy
γ is not a random variable in this expectation computation. The policy is a functional that
specifies what action to take in each time instant for a given type profile. Different policies
will lead to different sequences of allocation functions over the infinite horizon, and the
efficient allocation is the one that maximizes the expected discounted sum of the valuations
of all the agents.
In general, the allocation policy πt depends on the time instant t. However, for the special
kind of stochastic behavior of the type vectors, namely SMTT, and due to the infinite horizon
discounted utility, this policy becomes stationary, i.e., independent of t. We will denote such
a stationary policy by π = (a(·), a(·), . . .). Thus, the efficient allocation under SMTT reduces
to solving for the optimal action in the following stationary Markov Decision Problem (MDP).
W (θt) = max
pi
Epi,θt
[
∞∑
s=t
δs−t
∑
j∈N
vj(a(θs), θs)
]
= max
a∈A
Ea,θt
[∑
j∈N
vj(a, θt) + δEθt+1|a,θtW (θt+1)
]
. (4)
Here, with a slight abuse of notation, we have used a to denote the actual action taken in
t rather than the allocation function. The second equality comes from a standard recursive
argument for stationary infinite horizon MDPs. We refer an interested reader to standard
text (Puterman, 2005, e.g.) for this reduction and the general properties of MDPs. We have
used the following shorthand, Eθt+1|a,θt [·] =
∑
θt+1
p(θt+1|θt; at)[·]. We will refer to W as the
social welfare. The efficient allocation under SMTT is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Efficient Allocation, EFF) An allocation policy a(·) is efficient under
SMTT if for all type profiles θt,
a(θt) ∈ argmax
a∈A
Ea,θt
[∑
j∈N
vj(a, θt) + δEθt+1|a,θtW (θt+1),
]
. (5)
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...
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Figure 1: Graphical illustration of a candidate dynamic mechanism in an interdependent
value setting.
Challenges in mechanism design with interdependent valuations The value
interdependency among the agents poses a challenge for designing mechanisms. Even in a
static setting, if the allocation and payment are decided simultaneously under the interdepen-
dent valuation setting, efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility (and therefore ex-post
incentive compatibility) cannot be satisfied together (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001). In a later
paper, Jehiel et al. (2006) show that the only deterministic social choice functions that are
ex-post implementable in generic mechanism design frameworks with multi-dimensional sig-
nals, interdependent valuations, and transferable utilities are constant functions. In view of
these impossibility results, we are compelled to split the decisions of allocation and payment
in two separate stages. We would mimic the two-stage mechanism of Mezzetti (2004) for
each time instant of the dynamic setting (see Figure 1). We consider a direct revelation
mechanism. In the first stage of this two-stage mechanism, the agents observe their indi-
vidual types θi,t ∈ Θi, i ∈ N . The strategies available to the agents are to report any type
θˆi,t ∈ Θi. The designer decides the allocation a(θˆt) depending on the reported types θˆt in
first stage. The reported types of the agents are not revealed publicly in the first stage. This
assumption plays a crucial role in the concept of incentive compatibility we use in this paper.
We discuss this after the definition of incentive compatibility briefly and in detail in the next
section. After the allocation, the agents observe their valuations vi(a(θˆt), θt)’s, and report
vˆi,t’s to the designer. The payment decision is made after this second stage of reporting. Our
definition of incentive compatibility is accordingly modified for a two stage mechanism.
Due to SMTT and the infinite horizon of the MDP, we will focus only on stationary
mechanisms, that give a stationary allocation and payment to the agents in each round of
the dynamic game. Let us denote a typical two-stage dynamic mechanism byM = 〈a, p〉. The
function a : Θ→ A yields an allocation for a reported type profile θˆt in round t. Depending
on the reported types in the first stage, the mechanism designer decides the allocation a(θˆt),
due to which agent i experiences a valuation of vi(a(θˆt), θt) in round t. Let us suppose that
in the second stage, the reported value vector is given by vˆt. The payment function p is
a vector where pi(θˆt, vˆt) is the payment received by agent i at instant t. Combining the
value and payment in each round we can write the expected discounted utility of agent i in
the quasi-linear setting, denoted by uMi (θˆt, vˆt|θt), when the true type vector is θt and the
reported type and value vectors are θˆt and vˆt respectively. This utility has two parts: (a) the
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current round utility, and (b) expectation over the future round utilities. The expectation
over the future rounds is taken on the true types. Thus the effect of manipulation is limited
only to the current round in this utility expression. This is enough to consider due to the
single deviation principle of Blackwell (1965).
uMi (θˆt, vˆt|θt)
= vi(a(θˆt), θt) + pi(θˆt, vˆt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
current round utility
+Epi,θt
[
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t(vi(a(θs), θs) + pi(θs, vs))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected discounted future utility
(6)
Here π denotes the stationary policy of actions, (a(·), a(·), . . .). For the SMTT, the type
evolution is dependent on only the current type profile and action. To avoid confusion, we
will use π, a(θˆt), or a(θs), s ≥ t + 1, according to the context.
Equipped with this notation, we can now define incentive compatibility.
Definition 5 (w.p. EPIC) A mechanism M = 〈a, p〉 is within period Ex-post Incentive
Compatible (w.p. EPIC) if for all agents i ∈ N , for all possible true types θt, for all reported
types θˆi,t, for all reported values vˆi,t, and for all t,
uMi (θt, (vi(a(θt), θt), v−i(a(θt), θt))|θt)
≥ uMi ((θˆi,t, θ−i,t), (vˆi,t, v−i(a(θˆi,t, θ−i,t), θt))|θt)
That is, reporting the types and valuations in the two stages truthfully is an ex-post Nash
equilibrium. We use ‘ex-post’ to denote that the agent chooses her action after observing her
own type and valuation, and not the types of others, since that is not revealed to her according
to the mechanism considered here. 1 The reported valuation vˆi,t is therefore a function of
the types θi,t and θˆi,t and not of either θ−i,t and θˆ−i,t, according to the assumption above.
An interesting question would be: what happens when the agents’ type reports in the first
stage are made public. The agents’ valuation reports in the second stage can then depend
on the type reports in the first stage. The appropriate equilibrium concept in that setting
is the subgame perfect equilibrium. We present a detailed discussion on the implications of
revealing the type reports in the first stage after presenting the proposed mechanism in the
next section.
In this context, individual rationality is defined as follows.
1Some readers may interpret the term ‘ex-post’ differently, since the term is conventionally used in the
context of single stage mechanisms, i.e., where the decisions of allocation and transfer are decided simultane-
ously (see, e.g., Jehiel et al. (2006)) and it denotes that truthful reporting is optimal for every realization of
the other agents’ types even if the agent knew the other agents’ types. In the context of two-stage mechanisms
that we consider here, we feel that this equilibrium of full observability can be better called as ‘subgame
perfect’ equilibrium. This is the equilibrium concept used in the static two stage mechanism by Mezzetti
(2004), and we discuss in detail the difference of the two equilibria concepts in the next section.
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Definition 6 (w.p. EPIR) A mechanism M = 〈a, p〉 is within period Ex-post Individu-
ally Rational (w.p. EPIR) if for all agents i ∈ N , for all possible true types θt and for all
t,
uMi (θt, (vi(a(θt), θt), v−i(a(θt), θt))|θt) ≥ 0.
That is, reporting the types and valuations in the two stages truthfully yields non-negative
expected utility.
3 The MATRIX Mechanism under SA and PIV
In the interdependent valuation setting, our goal is to design a mechanism which is efficient
(Def. 4), w.p. EPIC (Def. 5), and w.p. EPIR (Def. 6). This is non-trivial because to achieve
efficient allocation in a dynamic setting, one needs to consider the expected future evolution
of the types of the agents, which would reflect in the allocation and payment decisions,
and for this reason a fixed payment mechanism or a repeated VCG fails to satisfy efficiency
(Def. 4). The value interdependency among the agents plays a crucial role here. Even in a
static interdependent value setting, if the allocation and payment are decided simultaneously,
one cannot guarantee efficiency and incentive compatibility together (Jehiel and Moldovanu,
2001). One way out is to split the decision of allocation and payment in two stages (Mezzetti,
2004).
Following this observation, we propose MDP-based Allocation and TRansfer in
Interdependent-valued eXchange economies (MATRIX), which we prove to satisfy EFF, w.p.
EPIC and w.p. EPIR under the restricted setting of SA and PIV.
Given the dynamics of the game, illustrated in Figure 1, the agents report their types
in the first stage, and then the allocation is decided. In the second stage, they report
their experienced values and the payment is decided. The task of the mechanism designer,
therefore, is to design the allocation and payment rules 〈a, p〉 in each time instant.
In the context of SA and PIV, the social welfare given by Eq. (4) is modified as follows.
W (θt) = max
pi
Epi,θt
[
∞∑
s=t
δs−t
∑
j∈N
vj(a(θs), θa(θs))
]
= max
a∈A
Ea,θt
[∑
j∈N
vj(a, θa) + δEθt+1|a,θtW (θt+1)
]
. (7)
We also define the maximum social welfare excluding agent i to be W−i(θ−i,t), which is
the same as Eq. (4) except now the sum of the valuations and the allocations are over all
agents j 6= i. We also use the set of allocations excluding i to be A−i as defined by SA,
W−i(θ−i,t)
= max
a−i∈A−i
Ea−i,θt

 ∑
j∈N\{i}
vj(a−i, θa−i) + δEθt+1|a−i,θtW−i(θ−i,t+1)

 . (8)
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Note that, SA and PIV are crucial for defining this quantity. Also, when i is absent, the
following two notations are equivalent: Eθt+1|a−i,θt[·] = Eθ−i,t+1|a−i,θ−i,t[·], since the type of i
will be unchanged when she is not in the game. However, we adopt the former for consistency
in notation. Using the definitions above and in the previous section, now we formally present
MATRIX.
Mechanism 1 (MATRIX) Given the reported type profile θˆt in stage 1, choose the agents
a∗(θˆt) as follows.
a∗(θˆt) ∈ argmax
a∈A
Ea,θˆt
[∑
j∈N
vj(a, θˆa) + δEθt+1|a,θˆtW (θt+1),
]
(9)
and transfer to agent i after agents report vˆt in stage 2, a payment of,
p∗i (θˆt, vˆt) =
(∑
j 6=i
vˆj,t
)
+ δEθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θˆtW−i(θ−i,t+1)−W−i(θˆ−i,t)
−
(
vˆi,t − vi(a
∗(θˆt), θˆa∗(θˆt))
)2
. (10)
Algorithm 1 MATRIX
for all time instants t do
Stage 1:
for agents i = 0, 1, . . . , n do
agent i observes θi,t;
agent i reports θˆi,t;
end for
compute allocation a∗(θˆt) according to Eq. 9;
Stage 2:
for agents i = 0, 1, . . . , n do
agent i observes vi(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt));
agent i reports vˆi,t;
end for
compute payment to agent i, p∗i (θˆt, vˆt), Eq. 10;
types evolve θt → θt+1 according to SMTT;
end for
The last quadratic term in
the above equation is agent
i’s penalty of not being con-
sistent with the first stage re-
port. The intuition of charg-
ing a penalty is to make sure
that agent i be consistent with
her reported type θˆi,t in the
first stage and her value re-
port vˆi,t in the second stage,
given that others are reporting
their types and values truth-
fully. We will argue that when
all agents other than agent i
reports their types and val-
ues truthfully in the two stages
of the mechanism, it is the
best response for agent i to do
so as well. This term distin-
guishes our mechanism from
that given by Mezzetti (2004), where the agents are weakly indifferent between reporting
true and false values in the second stage. We summarize the dynamics of MATRIX using an
algorithmic flowchart in Algorithm 1.
10
We have used this quadratic term for the ease of exposition. However, it is easy to
show that any non-negative function g(x, ℓ) having the property that g(x, ℓ) = 0 ⇔ x = ℓ
would still satisfy the claims made in this paper. Nath and Zoeter (2013) use a similar
term to ensure strict truthfulness in the second stage of a two stage static mechanism with
interdependent valuations.
MATRIX and Subgame Perfection Since this paper is an extension of the results of
Nath and Zoeter (2013) to a dynamic type setting, we can do similar comparisons of prop-
erties with the mechanism of Mezzetti (2004) (let us call this the classic mechanism). If we
consider the case where the first stage type reports are made public by the mechanism, i.e.,
observable by all agents, then the agents have a chance of modifying their next stage report
depending on that information. The concept of truthfulness should be modified to subgame
perfect equilibrium in this context, which ensures that truth-telling is an equilibrium in every
subgame of the two stage game. It can be shown that an agent i can misreport her type
in the first stage from θi to θˆi when other agents are reporting their types truthfully and in
this subgame, since the reported types are public, each agent’s best response would be to
report valuations consistent with the first stage’s reported types vi(a
∗(θˆt), θˆa∗(θˆt)) (and not
the true valuations vi(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt))), which results in more utility to agent i than reporting
types truthfully in the first stage (see Nath and Zoeter (2013), where Example 1 illustrates
this and can be modified in the dynamic setting for a similar conclusion). Hence, if the first
stage reports are made public, MATRIX does not ensure truthfulness in a subgame perfect
equilibrium. The classic mechanism, on the other hand, continues to satisfy truth-telling
in a subgame perfect equilibrium even in this complete information scenario, and this is
because the utility of the agent is unaffected by her second stage valuation reports. So,
to summarize, in the incomplete information setting, MATRIX provides a strict truthfulness
guarantee in the second stage and the truthfulness is in an ex-post Nash equilibrium, but in
a complete information setting, it does not ensure truthfulness in a subgame perfect equilib-
rium, while the classic mechanism is not strictly truthful in an ex-post Nash equilibrium for
an incomplete information setting, but is weakly truthful in a subgame perfect equilibrium
in the complete information setting. It is important to note that even though the classic
mechanism is weakly truthful in the second stage, and every agent’s utility is unaffected by
their valuation report, the truthfulness in the type reports in the first stage requires that the
agents be truthful in the second stage. Hence, one needs to assume in the mechanism by
Mezzetti (2004) that the agents report their valuations truthfully even when their utilities
are unaffected by their reports.
3.1 Efficiency and incentive compatibility
The following theorem shows that MATRIX satisfies two desirable properties in the unrestricted
setting.
Theorem 1 Under SMTT, with SA and PIV, MATRIX is EFF and w.p. EPIC. In addition,
the second stage of MATRIX is strictly EPIC.
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MATRIX is a two stage mechanism, and we need to ensure that truth-telling is a best
response in both these stages.
Proof : Clearly, given true reported types, the allocation of MATRIX is efficient by Defini-
tion 4. Hence, we need to show only that MATRIX is w.p. EPIC.
To show that MATRIX is w.p. EPIC, let us assume that the true type profile at time t is
θt, and all agents j 6= i report their true types and values in each round s = t, t + 1, · · ·
etc. Only agent i reports θˆi,t and vˆi,t in the two stages. Therefore, θˆt = (θˆi,t, θ−i,t) and
vˆj,t = vj(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt)), for all j 6= i. Using the single deviation principle (Blackwell, 1965),
we conclude that it is enough to consider only a single shot deviation from the true report
of the type. Hence, without loss of generality, let us assume that agent i deviates only in
round t of this game.
Let us write down the discounted utility to agent i at time t.
uMATRIXi ((θˆi,t, θ−i,t), (vˆi,t, v−i(a
∗(θˆi,t, θ−i,t), θa∗(θˆi,t,θ−i,t)))|θt)
= vi(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt)) + p
∗
i (θˆt, vˆt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
current round utility
+ Epi∗,θt
[
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t(vi(a
∗(θs), θa∗(θs)) + p
∗
i (θs, vs))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected discounted future utility
= vi(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt)) +
∑
j 6=i
vˆj,t + δEθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θˆtW−i(θ−i,t+1)−W−i(θˆ−i,t)
−
(
vˆi,t − vi(a
∗(θˆt), θˆa∗(θˆt))
)2
+ Epi∗,θt
[
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t(vi(a
∗(θs), θa∗(θs)) + p
∗
i (θs, vs))
]
We use the shorthand π∗ to denote the allocation policy under MATRIX. This gives rise
to the allocations a(·) in each round given the type profiles (either reported or true). The
first equality is from Eq. (6). The second equality comes by substituting the expression of
payment from Eq. (10).
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Now, from the previous discussion on the vˆj,t’s and θˆj,t’s, j 6= i, we get,
uMATRIXi ((θˆi,t, θ−i,t), (vˆi,t, v−i(a
∗(θˆi,t, θ−i,t), θa∗(θˆi,t,θ−i,t)))|θt)
= vi(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt)) +
∑
j 6=i
vj(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt)) + δEθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θˆtW−i(θ−i,t+1)
−W−i(θ−i,t)−
(
vˆi,t − vi(a
∗(θˆt), θˆa∗(θˆt))
)2
+ Epi∗,θt
[
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t(vi(a
∗(θs), θa∗(θs)) + p
∗
i (θs, vs))
]
≤ vi(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt)) +
∑
j 6=i
vj(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt)) + δEθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θˆtW−i(θ−i,t+1)
−W−i(θ−i,t) + Epi∗,θt
[
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t(vi(a
∗(θs), θa∗(θs)) + p
∗
i (θs, vs))
]
(11)
The equality comes because of the assumption that all agents j 6= i report their types
and values truthfully. The inequality is because we are ignoring a non-positive term. Now,
let us consider the last term of the above equation.
Epi∗,θt
[
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t(vi(a
∗(θs), θa∗(θs)) + p
∗
i (θs, vs))
]
= Epi∗,θt
[ ∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t
(
vi(a
∗(θs), θa∗(θs)) +
∑
j 6=i
vj(a
∗(θs), θa∗(θs))
+ δEθs+1|a∗(θs),θsW−i(θ−i,s+1)−W−i(θ−i,s)
)]
= Epi∗,θt
[ ∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t
(∑
j∈N
vj(a
∗(θs), θa∗(θs))
+ δEθs+1|a∗(θs),θsW−i(θ−i,s+1)−W−i(θ−i,s)
)]
The first equality comes from Eq. (10). We can now rearrange the expectation for the first
term above using the Markov property of θt that gives, Epi∗,θt [·] = Eθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θt [Epi∗,θt+1[·]].
Therefore,
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Epi∗,θt
[
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t(vi(a
∗(θs), θa∗(θs)) + p
∗
i (θs, vs))
]
= Eθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θt
[
Epi∗,θt+1
(
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t
∑
j∈N
vj(a
∗(θs), θa∗(θs))
)]
+ Epi∗,θt
[
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t
(
δEθs+1|a∗(θs),θsW−i(θ−i,s+1)−W−i(θ−i,s)
)]
= Eθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θt (δW (θt+1))
+ Epi∗,θt
[
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t
(
δEθs+1|a∗(θs),θsW−i(θ−i,s+1)−W−i(θ−i,s)
)]
(12)
The last equality comes from the definition of W (θt+1). Let us now focus on the last
term of the above equation.
Epi∗,θt
[
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t
(
δEθs+1|a∗(θs),θsW−i(θ−i,s+1)−W−i(θ−i,s)
)]
=
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
δ2Epi∗,θtW−i(θ−i,t+2)− δEθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θtW−i(θ−i,t+1)
+
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
δ3Epi∗,θtW−i(θ−i,t+3)−
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
δ2Epi∗,θtW−i(θ−i,t+2)
+ · · · −
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
δ3Epi∗,θtW−i(θ−i,t+3)
+ · · · − · · ·
= −δEθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θtW−i(θ−i,t+1) (13)
Combining Equations 11, 12, and 13, we get,
uMATRIXi ((θˆi,t, θ−i,t), (vˆi,t, v−i(a
∗(θˆi,t, θ−i,t), θa∗(θˆi,t,θ−i,t)))|θt)
≤ vi(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt)) +
∑
j 6=i
vj(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt)) + δEθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θˆtW−i(θ−i,t+1)
− W−i(θ−i,t) + δEθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θt [W (θt+1)−W−i(θ−i,t+1)] (14)
We also note that,
Eθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θˆtW−i(θ−i,t+1) = Eθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θtW−i(θ−i,t+1) (15)
This is because when i is removed from the system in SA domain (while computing
W−i(θ−i,t+1)), the values of none of the other agents will depend on the type θi,t+1, due to
PIV. And due to the independence of type transitions, i’s reported type θˆi,t can only influence
θi,t+1. Hence, the reported value of agent i at t, i.e., θˆi,t cannot affect W−i(θ−i,t+1).
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Hence, Equation 14 can be rewritten to show the following inequality.
uMATRIXi ((θˆi,t, θ−i,t), (vˆi,t, v−i(a
∗(θˆi,t, θ−i,t), θa∗(θˆi,t,θ−i,t)))|θt)
≤ vi(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt)) +
∑
j 6=i
vj(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt)) +
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
✭
δEθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θtW−i(θ−i,t+1)
−W−i(θ−i,t) + δEθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θt [W (θt+1)−✭✭✭
✭
✭
✭✭
W−i(θ−i,t+1)] (from Eq. 15)
=
∑
j∈N
vj(a
∗(θˆt), θa∗(θˆt)) + δEθt+1|a∗(θˆt),θtW (θt+1)−W−i(θ−i,t)
≤
∑
j∈N
vj(a
∗(θt), θa∗(θt)) + δEθt+1|a∗(θt),θtW (θt+1)−W−i(θ−i,t)
(by definition of a∗(θt), Eq. 9)
= uMATRIXi (θt, (vi(a
∗(θt), θa∗(θt)), v−i(a
∗(θt), θa∗(θt)))|θt). (16)
This shows that utility of agent i is maximized when θˆi,t = θi,t and vˆi,t = vi(a
∗(θt), θa∗(θt)).
This proves that MATRIX is within period ex-post incentive compatible.
We now argue that the second stage is strictly EPIC for an agent i. This happens because
of the quadratic penalty term
(
vˆi,t − vi(a
∗(θˆt), θˆa∗(θˆt))
)2
in the payment p∗i (Eq. (10)). Notice
that if all the agents except i report the types and values truthfully, and agent i also reports
her type truthfully in the first stage, then the penalty term will always penalize her if vˆi,t
is different from vi(a
∗(θt), θa∗(θˆt)), which is her true valuation. Hence, the best response of
agent i would be to report the true values in the second stage, which makes MATRIX strictly
EPIC in this stage. 
3.2 Why a dynamic pivot mechanism would not work in this set-
ting
It is interesting to note that, if we tried to use the dynamic pivot mechanism (DPM),
(Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2010), unmodified in this setting, the true type profile θt in the
first summation of Eq. (14) would have been replaced by θˆt, since this comes from the
payment term (Eq. (10)). The proof for the DPM relies on the private value assumption (see
the beginning of Section 2 for a definition) such that, when reasoning about the valuations
for the other agents j 6= i, we have vj(a
∗((θˆi,t, θ−i,t)), (θˆi,t, θ−i,t)) = vj(a
∗(θˆt), θj,t), with which
the EPIC claim of DPM can be shown. But in the interdependent value setting, we cannot
do such a substitution, and hence the proof of EPIC in DPM does not work. We have to
invoke the second stage of value reporting in order to satisfy the EPIC.
3.3 Ex-post individual rationality
With SA and PIV, we now show that MATRIX is individually rational.
Theorem 2 (Individual Rationality) Under SMTT, with SA and PIV, MATRIX is w.p.
EPIR.
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Proof : Due to SA, the set of allocations excluding agent i, denoted by A−i = 2
N\{i}, is
already contained in the set of allocations including i, denoted by A = 2N . Formally, this
means a−i ∈ A−i ⊆ A ∋ a. Therefore, the policies π−i ∈ A
∞
−i ⊆ A
∞ ∋ π. Hence in the
ex-post Nash equilibrium, the utility of agent i is given by,
uMATRIXi (θt, (vi(a(θt), θt), v−i(a(θt), θt))|θt)
=
∑
j∈N
vj(a
∗(θt), θt) + δEθt+1|a∗(θt),θtW (θt+1)−W−i(θ−i,t)
= W (θt)−W−i(θ−i,t)
≥ 0.
The first equality comes from the last equality in Equation 16 and the second equality is by
definition of W (θt) and a
∗(θt). The last inequality is an immediate consequence of SA and
PIV, as the allocation that maximizes the social welfare excluding agent i is already in the
potential allocations when i is present. This proves that MATRIX is within period ex-post
individually rational.

3.4 Complexity of computing the allocation and payment
The non-strategic version of the resource to task assignment problem was that of solving an
MDP, whose complexity was polynomial in the size of state-space (Ye, 2005). Interestingly,
for the proposed mechanism, the allocation and payment decisions are also solutions of MDPs
(Equations 9, 10). Hence the proposed mechanism MATRIX has polynomial time complexity
in the number of agents and size of the state-space, which is the same as that of the dynamic
pivot mechanism (Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2010).
4 Discussions on a General Result
We can generalize the assumptions of SA and PIV in the following way that would result
in the same conclusions as in this paper. These definitions also serve to show the minimal
requirements of the proofs.
Consider a set of all possible allocations denoted by A. The valuations are called inde-
pendent of irrelevant agents (IIA) with respect to a set of allocations A ⊆ A if for all i ∈ N ,
∃ A−i ⊆ A s.t. ∀ a−i ∈ A−i,
vj(a−i, θ) = vj(a−i, θ−i)
vi(a−i, θ) = 0
SA and PIV together constitute a special case of IIA valuations. However, there exist
not-so-restrictive examples as well. Consider a set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n} having types
θ1, θ2, . . . , θn and a dummy agent D who does not have any type. Let A = 2
N∪{D} and
A = 2N . We define A−i = 2
N∪{D}\{i}, the power set of agents where the dummy replaces
agent i. Since the dummy does not have any type, the valuations of other agents after
replacing agent i with D depends only on θ−i. Note, in particular, that A−i * A.
16
If now, in addition, A−i ⊆ A, then the allocations are called monotone. SA is a monotone
set of allocations and PIV is IIA over that.
We can show that Theorem 1 extends with IIA valuations and Theorem 2 extends with
IIA valuations with respect to monotone allocations. We omit the proofs since they follow
identical arguments.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper provides a first attempt of designing a dynamic mechanism that is strict ex-post
incentive compatible and efficient in an interdependent value setting with Markovian type
evolution. In a restricted domain, which appears often in real-world scenarios, we show that
our mechanism is ex-post individually rational as well. This mechanism, MATRIX, extends
the mechanism proposed by Mezzetti (2004) to a dynamic setting and connects it to the
mechanism proposed by Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010).
We have discussed the interesting and challenging domain of mechanism design with
dynamically varying types and interdependent valuations. There has been very little work
where dynamic types and interdependent values have been addressed together. Hence, there
is very little known on the limits of achievable properties in this domain. We have provided
one mechanism, namely MATRIX, that is w.p. EPIC, strict in the second stage, and under
a restricted domain, even w.p. EPIR. However, we do not know what mechanism charac-
terizes those properties in this domain. For example, a question that may arise is “Is this
the only efficient dynamic mechanism that satisfies strict w.p. EPIC in an interdependent
value setting?”. For the static setting with independent values we have the Green-Laffont
characterization result that answers this question for efficiency and DSIC. However, such a
characterization result is absent for interdependent valuations for both static and dynamic
mechanisms. Developing such a full characterization would be worthwhile.
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